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1. Overview 
International financial centres (IFCs) are characterised by favourable tax regimes for foreign 
corporations. They are theorised to affect developing countries in three key ways. First, they divert 
real and financial flows away from developing countries. Second, they erode developing countries’ 
tax bases and thus public resources. Third, IFCs can affect developing countries’ own tax policies 
by motivating governments to engage in tax competition. The form and scale of these effects 
across different countries depend on complex interactions between their national tax policies and 
those of IFCs.  
In order to better understand the relationship between national tax regimes and development, in 
2006, the IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank recommended to the G-20 that all members undertake 
“spillover analyses” to assess the impact of their tax policies on developing countries. The fact that 
only two well-recognised IFCs (the Netherlands and Ireland) have done so prevents a rigorous 
comparative analysis of which centres most affect developing countries and how.  
This review provides suggestive evidence of key IFCs for developing countries by analysing capital 
movements to and from selected regions and economies. While these capital flows are not driven 
by tax considerations alone, their concentration in certain jurisdictions is suggestive. Through this 
analysis, it identifies five global IFCs that serve countries across the developing world. These key 
centres are: 
• The Netherlands. The Netherlands is a key source and/or destination of investment for 
every developing region. For example, nearly one third of inward and outward investment 
in the Middle East is channelled via the Netherlands. Three features of Dutch tax policy 
make the Netherlands an attractive conduit for global foreign direct investment (FDI). 
These include the extensive network of bilateral tax treaties, the low withholding taxes 
levied on cross-border flows and the special tax treatment of special purpose entities. 
There is evidence that these features facilitate tax avoidance by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) operating in developing countries, including treaty shopping and profit-shifting. 
The resulting public revenue loss for developing country governments is estimated to be 
between EUR 150-550 million per year. 
• The Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands rank among the top ten sources and/ or 
destinations of FDI for all developing regions except North Africa. A fifth of South 
America’s outward FDI goes to the Cayman Islands, at least initially. There is suggestive 
evidence that the Cayman Islands are an important destination for profit-shifting by MNCs 
due to the low-tax, highly secretive environment. However, the jurisdiction’s impact on 
developing countries remains under-researched. 
• The UK. The UK is a key source and destination of investment for most developing 
regions, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia. Four features of the 
UK tax system contribute to its status as a major IFC. First, the UK has one of the world’s 
largest tax treaty networks. Second, the UK has jurisdiction or sovereignty over ten 
territories that are recognised as tax havens. Third, the UK offers an increasingly 
favourable corporate tax regime. Fourth, the UK hosts various corporate structures and 
arrangements that may help facilitate tax avoidance. The UK government has resisted 
lobbying to conduct spillover analysis for various aspects of its tax regime. However, in 
2012, Action Aid estimated that UK reforms of controlled foreign company rules, which 
aimed to improve the corporate tax environment further, could cost developing countries 
£4 billion in annual tax revenues. 
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• The US. The US is the second largest recipient of global FDI and the largest source. It is 
a major provider of inward FDI for all developing regions (with the exception of the Gulf 
Economies for which it doesn’t report data) and a top destination for most. While this 
pattern reflects the relative size of its economy, the US also provides a wide array of 
secrecy and tax-free facilities for non-residents that may facilitate profit-shifting and other 
illicit financial flows. Additionally, it has not committed to international standards on 
exchange of information for tax purposes. Evidence on the impact of these policies on 
developing countries is not available. 
• Singapore. Singapore is a top source of inward FDI for Central and South Asia, East Asia, 
North Africa, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Its top sources of FDI are IFCs 
and/ or tax havens, while its top country destinations are mostly emerging economies in 
Asia (China, Indonesia, India and Hong Kong). Singapore provides full tax exemptions on 
most foreign income as well as various secrecy offerings, which make it a popular conduit 
for inward investment to Asia. 
2. IFCs and developing countries 
Defining IFCs 
The term “international financial centre” is often used interchangeably with “tax haven” or “secrecy 
jurisdiction” but there are no broadly agreed definitions of these terms (Fichtner et al., 2017; Waris, 
2014: 2). Territories labelled IFCs typically share several characteristics: a high concentration of 
financial intermediaries and service providers, plentiful foreign investment opportunities, 
connections with other centres, sophisticated regulatory and legislative frameworks and, crucially, 
favourable tax regimes for foreign income (Waris, 2014: 2). Tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions 
also tend to share these features and additionally offer very low or zero taxes and bank secrecy 
laws (Waris, 2014: 2). The OECD identifies tax havens using four criteria: no or nominal income 
taxes, a lack of effective exchange of information on taxpayers with other jurisdictions, a non-
transparent tax system and the absence of substantial activities (OECD, 1998: 23).1 The lack of 
common definition means that different global rankings of IFCs and/ or tax havens provide very 
different results depending on which criteria they emphasise. Table 1 compares some key rankings 
that are commonly cited in the literature. 
  
                                                 
1 The OECD no longer publishes lists of countries meeting these criteria (Hearson, 2014: 9). However, its Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum) reports on the second 
criteria by monitoring jurisdictions’ compliance with two internationally agreed standards on tax-related information 
exchange. These are the exchange of information on request (EOIR) standard and the automatic exchange of 
information standard (AEOI). The Global Forum monitors compliance with EOIR though a phased peer review 
process in which countries receive a rating of “Compliant” “Largely Compliant” “Partially Compliant” and “Non 
Compliant”. Work is currently underway to implement AEOI by 2018 (see OECD, n.d.). 
4 
Table 1: Selected global rankings of IFCs, tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions 
Name The Global Financial Centres 
Index (GCFI) 23 by Z/Yen Group 
The Financial Secrecy Index 
2018 by Tax Justice Network 
(TJN) 
 
FDI stocks relative to gross 
domestic product (GDP)  
Description The GCFI rates over 50 financial 
centres against five criteria: (i) 
human capital availability, (ii) 
business environment, (iii) market 
access, (iv) infrastructure and (v) 
general competitiveness. Details 
of these criteria and the GCFI’s 
scoring system can be found here. 
 
The  Financial Secrecy Index 
ranks jurisdictions according to 
their secrecy and the scale of their 
offshore financial activities. A full 
description of the methodology is 
here. 
The IMF (2014) and Fichtner et al. 
(2017) identify key IFCs by 
examining jurisdictions’ FDI stocks 
as a percentage of GDP. 
Results 1. London 
2. New York 
3. Hong 
Kong 
4. Singapore 
5. Tokyo 
6. Shanghai 
7. Toronto 
8. San 
Francisco 
9. Sydney 
10. Boston 
11. Beijing 
12. Melbourne 
13. Montreal 
14. Chicago 
15. Vancouver 
16. Zurich 
17. Los 
Angeles 
18. Shenzhen 
19. Dubai 
20. Frankfurt 
1. Switzerland 
2. USA 
3. Cayman 
Islands 
4. Hong Kong 
5. Singapore 
6. Luxem-
bourg 
7. Germany 
8. Taiwan 
9. United 
Arab 
Emirates 
(Dubai) 
10. Guernsey 
11. Lebanon 
12. Panama 
13. Japan 
14. Nether-
lands 
15. Thailand 
16. British 
Virgin 
Islands 
17. Bahrain 
18. Jersey 
19. Bahama 
20. Malta 
1. Luxem-
bourg 
2. Marshall 
Islands,  
3. Samoa 
4. Cyprus 
5. Bahamas 
6. Barbados 
7. Mauritius 
8. American 
Samoa 
9. Liberia 
10. Nether-
lands 
11. Seychelles 
12. Malta 
13. Ireland 
14. Hong Kong 
15. Singapore 
16. Switzer-land 
17. Belgium 
18. United 
Kingdom 
19. Tokelau 
Islands 
20. Hungary 
 
Source: Z/ Yen Group (2018); TJN (2018); Calculations from IMF (2018) and World Bank (2018). 
IFCs can be categorised in at least three ways. These categorisations are helpful for discussing 
their impact on developing countries. The first typology distinguishes between offshore, hybrid and 
integrated IFCs. Offshore centres do not allow for interaction between foreign and domestic 
investment markets (e.g. Dubai); hybrid centres allow for specific and conditional access of 
domestic investors to the international market (e.g. Qatar); and integrated centres allow for full 
access of international investors to domestic markets, with preferential treatment (e.g. London) 
(Waris, 2014: 2). The second typology divides IFCs into global centres that serve clients from all 
over the world; regional centres that serve regional markets; and local IFCs that cater mainly to 
the needs of their national economies (Waris, 2014: 2). The third typology distinguishes between 
“sink” IFCs, which attract and retain foreign capital, and “conduit” IFCs, which act as intermediate 
destinations (often en route to sinks). Sinks generally offer lower taxes and higher levels of secrecy, 
while conduits tend to have numerous tax treaties, low or zero withholding taxes on foreign income 
and “reputations for enabling the quiet transfer of capital” (Fichtner et al., 2017). 
There is some debate over the usefulness of the concept of IFCs and tax havens. For example, 
Hearson (2014a: 10) notes: 
Classifying jurisdictions as tax havens… can sometimes obscure the different and more 
complex ways in which tax laws in one country can affect others. For example, while the 
Obama administration withdrew its suggestion that the Netherlands is a tax haven, it is 
nevertheless widely acknowledged that the Netherlands’ tax treatment of certain types of 
transactions, combined with its extensive and beneficial tax treaty network, makes it a 
popular jurisdiction for tax planning structures. 
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Implications for development 
The IMF (2014: 12-3) identifies three key impacts of IFCs on developing countries. These “fiscal 
spillovers” arise from the favourable corporate tax laws and practices that characterise centres and 
havens. They include: 
• Diversion of real and financial flows. Countries’ tax laws play a significant role in shaping 
both the destination and route of international flows (IMF, 2014: 15). IFCs with very low 
and secretive tax rates attract capital from higher tax jurisdictions, while centres with 
favourable and extensive bilateral tax treaties act as conduits through which investments 
passes. Indicative evidence of this effect is the observed concentration of global FDI 
stocks in relatively small countries (see Table 1, column 3), a pattern that is “impossible 
to understand without reference to tax considerations” (IMF, 2014: 6). Additional direct 
evidence includes a 2008 meta-analysis of the investment effects of tax changes which 
found that a 10-percentage point reduction in a country’s effective tax rate increases its 
stock of FDI by over 30 percent on average (IMF, 2014: 16). The implication for developing 
countries that are not IFCs is a loss of capital, which negatively affects investment, growth 
and macroeconomic stability (IMF, 2014: 12). 
• Erosion of tax bases.  IFCs reduce other countries’ tax bases by affecting the location of 
both real activities and “paper” profits (that is, the location where profits are recorded for 
tax purposes). Evidence of the first effect is provided in the previous bullet, while the IMF’s 
review (2014) similarly finds strong evidence of extensive profit-shifting in response to tax 
laws. For example, it is “highly suggestive” that more than 42 percent of the net income 
earned by US majority-owned affiliates is recorded in countries commonly termed tax 
havens while less than 15 percent of their value added is created there (IMF, 2014: 17). 
Developing countries typically derive a greater proportion of their public revenue from 
corporate tax than advanced countries, so the implication of base erosion is to 
substantially reduce their fiscal performance (IMF, 2014: 7). 
• Tax competition. Governments in developing countries often respond to favourable tax 
regimes abroad by lowering headline tax rates or offering tax incentives, such as 
reductions on corporate income tax, liberalisation of import and export duties, tax holidays 
or tax exemptions for certain sectors (IMF, 2014: 21). They do this in order to attract 
foreign capital or to retain domestic capital. Evidence of competition in countries’ tax-
setting includes the steady decline in statutory corporate tax rates across all developing 
regions since 1970, as well as the proliferation of various types of tax incentive in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Hearson, 2014a: 21). Tax competition is problematic because most 
economists agree that fiscal incentives do not attract sufficient inward investment to 
outweigh the cost in lost revenue in developing countries (Hearson, 2014a: 27). 
Additionally, they can lead to economic distortions and corruption when granted on the 
basis of politicians’ or officials’ personal discretion (Hearson, 2014a: 28). 
Ultimately, these spillovers lead to an inefficient allocation of resources based on optimising tax 
savings rather than economic returns (IMF, 2014: 14; Weyzig, 2014: 4). In addition to these direct 
investment and fiscal effects, IFCs may also distort competition between MNCs and domestic 
companies, undermine governance by sapping public resources and weakening taxpayer morale 
and impede poverty alleviation (Weyzig, 2013: 4). 
The form and severity of spillovers across different countries depend on the complex interactions 
between their national tax policies (IMF, 2014: 13-4). These policies include “headline” statutory 
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tax rates, tax incentives, bilateral tax treaties intended to avoid double taxation; definitions of 
entities, instruments and transactions, and controlled foreign corporation (anti-avoidance) rules. 
Variations in these policies across countries create incentives and opportunities for taxpayers to 
engage in tax planning strategies, the aim of which is reduce their total tax payments (IMF, 2014: 
11). There are many types of tax planning strategy and an MNC or individual may combine several 
of these across multiple jurisdictions (IMF, 2014: 11). Table 2 provides some common examples. 
Table 2: International tax planning strategies 
Strategy Description 
Abusive transfer pricing Transfer pricing happens whenever two companies that are part of the same 
multinational group trade with each other. Abusive transfer pricing occurs when 
MNCs misprice these transactions in order to allocate income to the company that 
incurs lower tax rates. 
Exploiting mismatches MNCs can take advantage of tax arbitrage opportunities that arise if different 
countries classify the same entity, transaction, or financial instrument differently. 
For instance, one country may regard an instrument as debt so allow an interest 
deduction, while the country in which payments are received regards it as equity, 
and so imposes no or little tax. 
Treaty shopping Treaty networks can be exploited by MNCs to route income so as to reduce 
taxes. This is discussed further in the section on the Netherlands below. 
Locating asset sales 
in low-tax jurisdictions 
MNCs locate asset sales in low-tax jurisdictions to avoid capital gains taxes. 
Deferral MNCs resident in countries operating worldwide systems can defer home 
taxation of business income earned abroad by delaying paying it to the parent. 
Inversion MNCs may be able to escape repatriation charges or controlled foreign 
corporation rules by changing their residence. 
Source: IMF (2014: 11). 
However, while the overall effect of spillovers is to reduce collective efficiency, some jurisdictions, 
including some developing countries, benefit from them (IMF, 2014: 14). This is clearest in relation 
to profit-shifting: moving taxable income from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax one will reduce the 
collective revenue of both countries, but increase the revenue of the latter. Indeed, Hearson 
(2014a: 11) observes that the number of developing countries attempting to establish themselves 
as IFCs has grown, particularly among small island states and African economies (e.g. Ghana and 
Kenya). For these countries, the offshore finance industry could provide significant capital inflows, 
as well as employment and income opportunities (Hearson, 2014a: 11; Waris, 2014: 2). 
Recognising the complex relationship between tax policies and development, in 2006, the IMF, 
OECD, UN and World Bank recommended that all G-20 countries undertake “spillover analyses” 
to assess the impact of their tax systems on developing countries (Hearson, 2014a: 36). This 
“famous” recommendation has since become an increasingly common civil society demand 
(Hearson, 2015).2 However, only the Netherlands and Ireland have so far conducted spillover 
analyses. 
                                                 
2 For example, in 2012, Action Aid led a group of NGOs and parliamentarians in lobbying the UK government to 
conduct a spillover analysis of its reforms to controlled foreign company rule. The government refused on the 
grounds that it was “not feasible to produce an estimate that would be sufficiently robust or accurate to be of value” 
(Hearson, 2014a: 37). The Treasury told the International Development Committee: “[To conduct the analysis] one 
has to have a full understanding of the interactions between multinational companies located in developing 
countries and those developing countries and their tax systems, which is a very complex matter [and] not something 
that, frankly, either HM Treasury nor HM Revenue and Customs is well placed to make an assessment on” 
(Hearson 2014b). 
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3. Key IFCs 
The preceding section highlights a number of challenges in identifying which IFCs are key for 
developing countries. These include (i) a lack of definitional clarity, (ii) the complexity of the 
hypothesised relationship between national tax policies and development, and (iii) the absence of 
analysis of this relationship at the country level. Nevertheless, this section provides suggestive 
evidence of key IFCs by analysing capital movements to/ from developing regions and economies. 
Table 3 provides the top sources and destinations of investment for eight developing regions. In 
other words, it shows where outward investment from a region immediately goes to and where 
inward investment immediately comes from. Table 4 provides this data for selected developing 
countries, including the “BRICS” economies and five low and lower middle income countries. While 
these capital flows are not driven by tax considerations alone, their concentration in certain source 
or destination countries is suggestive. In particular, the following observations can be made: 
• Five countries stand out as global IFCs serving much of the developing world. The 
Netherlands is a key source and/or destination of investment for every developing region. 
For example, 31 percent of inward and outward investment in the Middle East is 
channelled via the Netherlands. Other countries that rank in the top 10 for inward + 
outward investment for most regions include the Cayman Islands (all regions except North 
Africa), the UK (all except the Gulf Economies and North Atlantic and Caribbean), the US 
(all except the Gulf Economies and North Africa) and Singapore (all except the Gulf 
Economies, North Atlantic and Caribbean and South America). Additionally, the British 
Virgin Islands are a key conduit of financial flows for four regions: Central and South Asia, 
East Asia, North Atlantic and Caribbean and South America. 
• There also appear to be important regional centres. In East Asia, 30 percent of inward 
investment comes from or via Hong Kong. Qatar is the source of 56 percent of inward 
investment to the Gulf Economies, while the United Arab Emirates is the source of 35 
percent to North Africa. In North Atlantic and the Caribbean, half of outward investment 
goes to Aruba and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, at least initially. 
• Finally, Table 4 highlights that many emerging and developing economies have important 
bilateral relationships with other IFCs/ tax havens listed in Table 1. For example, 39% of 
Russia’s combined inward and outward FDI is channelled through Cyprus, while 30% of 
India’s is via Mauritius. For the selected low and lower middle income countries, as well 
as China and South Africa, it is notable that the majority of their cross-border investment 
is with just one or two countries.  
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Table 3: Top 10 destinations and sources of FDI by developing region.* 
Source: Calculations from IMF (2018) 
Outward FDI 
Central and 
South Asia 
East Asia 
Gulf 
Economies 
North Africa 
Atlantic and 
Caribbean 
Other Middle 
East 
South 
America 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Singapore 
(16) 
China: 
Mainland (27) 
Saudi Arabia 
(17) 
France (20) Aruba (25) 
Netherlands 
(49) 
Cayman 
Islands (20) 
India (26) 
Netherlands 
(11) 
United States 
(18) 
Cayman 
Islands (12) 
Cote d'Ivoire 
(18) 
Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and 
Saba (24) 
United States 
(12) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (15) 
China: 
Mainland (22) 
Mauritius (9) Virgin Islands, 
British (18) 
Iraq (13) 
Luxembourg 
(9) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (21) 
Turkey (11) 
Bahamas, The 
(11) 
United 
Kingdom (6) 
United 
Kingdom (6) 
United 
Kingdom (5) 
Bahrain (12) Benin (5) Canada (5) 
Switzerland 
(4) 
Austria (10) Singapore (5) 
Cayman 
Islands (6) 
Netherlands 
(4) 
Turkey (7) 
United 
Kingdom (5) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (4) 
United 
Kingdom (3) 
Panama (9) 
Netherlands 
(3) 
Indonesia (6) 
Cayman 
Islands (3) 
United Arab 
Emirates (7) 
Gabon (4) Jamaica (4) Georgia (3) 
United States 
(7) 
Mauritius (3) 
United States 
(6) 
Australia (3) Tunisia (5) 
Switzerland 
(3) 
Netherlands 
(4) 
Canada (3) Brazil (6) 
United States 
(3) 
China.: Hong 
Kong (4) 
Thailand (2) 
Netherlands 
(5) 
Mali (3) Curacao (3) Japan (2) 
Luxembourg 
(5) 
United Arab 
Emirates (2) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (4) 
Singapore (2) Jordan (4) 
Netherlands 
(3) 
United States 
(3) 
Germany (2) Argentina (5) 
Luxembourg 
(2) 
Australia (3) China: Hong 
Kong (2) 
United 
Kingdom (3) 
Cameroon (3) 
Sint Maarten 
(2) 
Cayman 
Islands (2) 
Peru (4) 
South Africa 
(2) 
Inward FDI 
Central and 
South Asia 
East Asia 
Gulf 
Economies 
North Africa 
Atlantic and 
Caribbean 
Other Middle 
East 
South 
America 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
United States 
(15) 
China: Hong 
Kong (30) 
Qatar (56) France (39) Barbados (24) 
United States 
(19) 
Netherlands 
(20) 
United 
Kingdom (15) 
Japan (11) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (21) 
Bahrain (14) 
United Arab 
Emirates (35) 
Netherlands 
(21) 
Netherlands 
(15) 
United States 
(19) 
United States 
(13) 
Netherlands 
(10) 
China: 
Mainland (9) 
Saudi Arabia 
(10) 
Spain (3) 
Cayman 
Islands (10) 
United 
Kingdom (9) 
Spain (11) 
Netherlands 
(12) 
Singapore (8) Japan (5) 
United Arab 
Emirates (8) 
Kuwait (3) 
United States 
(10) 
Cayman 
Islands (7) 
Luxembourg 
(6) 
Cayman 
Islands (8) 
United 
Kingdom (7) 
United States 
(5) 
Oman (6) 
Netherlands 
(3) 
Canada (9) Turkey (6) Canada (4) India (4) 
Mauritius (5) 
Cayman 
Islands (4) 
Jersey (2) Singapore (2) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (6) 
Russian 
Federation (4) 
United 
Kingdom (4) 
South Africa 
(4) 
China: 
Mainland (4) 
Singapore (4) France (2) 
Switzerland 
(2) 
Anguilla (6) Singapore (4) France (4) Singapore (4) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (4) 
Netherlands 
(4) 
China: 
Mainland (1) 
United 
Kingdom (1) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (3) 
Luxembourg 
(4) 
Japan (4) Bermuda (3) 
China: Hong 
Kong (4) 
Republic of  
Korea (2) 
Republic of  
Korea (0.4) 
Gibraltar (1) St. Lucia (3) Canada (4) 
Switzerland 
(3) 
United Arab 
Emirates (3) 
Switzerland 
(4) 
Bermuda (2) 
Cayman 
Islands (0.2) 
United States 
(1) 
Argentina (2) Norway (3) Germany (2) France (3) 
Inward + Outward FDI 
Central and 
South Asia 
East Asia 
Gulf 
Economies 
North Africa 
Atlantic and 
Caribbean 
Other Middle 
East 
South 
America 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
United States 
(14) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (20) 
Saudi Arabia 
(15) 
France (37) Aruba (18) 
Netherlands 
(31) 
United States 
(16) 
India (13) 
Netherlands 
(10) 
China: Hong 
Kong (18) 
Qatar (13) 
United Arab 
Emirates (31) 
Barbados (18) 
United States 
(16) 
Netherlands 
(12) 
United 
Kingdom (11) 
Japan (10) 
China: 
Mainland (16) 
Bahrain (12) Spain (3) 
Netherlands 
(15) 
Turkey (8) Spain (9) 
China: 
Mainland (10) 
Singapore (9) United States 
(10) 
Cayman 
Islands (11) 
Netherlands 
(3) 
Canada (9) 
United 
Kingdom (7) 
Cayman 
Islands (6) 
Netherlands 
(9) 
United 
Kingdom (7) 
Cayman 
Islands (4) 
Iraq (10) Kuwait (3) 
Cayman 
Islands (7) 
Cayman 
Islands (4) 
Luxembourg 
(6) 
United States 
(9) 
Mauritius (6) 
Netherlands 
(4) 
United Arab 
Emirates (7) 
Cote d'Ivoire 
(2) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (7) 
Canada (3) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (6) 
Cayman 
Islands (5) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (4) 
Singapore (3) Turkey (6) Singapore (2) 
United States 
(7) 
Switzerland 
(3) 
United 
Kingdom (3) 
Singapore (5) 
China: 
Mainland (4) 
United 
Kingdom (3) 
Tunisia (4) 
Switzerland 
(2) 
Anguilla (4) 
Luxembourg 
(3) 
Bahamas, The 
(3) 
South Africa 
(3) 
China: Hong 
Kong (4) 
Japan (3) 
Netherlands 
(4) 
Luxembourg 
(2) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (3) 
Russian 
Federation (3) 
France (3) 
United Arab 
Emirates (3) 
Cayman 
Islands (4) 
Korea, 
Republic of (2) 
Jordan (3) 
United 
Kingdom (2) 
Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and 
Saba (2) 
Singapore (2) Canada (3) Mauritius (2) 
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*Figures in parentheses are the percentage of total inward/ outward regional FDI attributable to that country. 
Table 4: Top 5 counterparts of FDI, selected developing countries 
Inward + Outward FDI: BRICS 
Brazil 
Russia 
Federation 
India 
China: 
Mainland 
South Africa 
United States 
(15) 
Cyprus (39) Mauritius (20) 
China: Hong 
Kong (54) 
China: 
Mainland  (27) 
Netherlands 
(14) 
Netherlands 
(13)  
United States 
(15) 
United States 
(7) 
United 
Kingdom (23) 
Spain (9) 
Virgin Islands, 
British (7) 
United 
Kingdom (12) 
Japan (6) 
Netherlands 
(12) 
Cayman 
Islands (8) 
Bahamas, The 
(6) 
Singapore 
(11) 
South Africa 
(5) 
United States 
(5) 
Luxembourg 
(8) 
Switzerland 
(4) 
Japan (7) Germany (4) Mauritius (4) 
Inward + Outward FDI: Low and lower middle income economies 
Democratic 
Rep. Congo 
El Salvador Myanmar Morocco Pakistan 
Mauritius (76) 
United States 
(27) 
Thailand (51) France (37) 
United 
Kingdom (35) 
South Africa 
(13) Panama (26) 
Republic of 
Korea (32) 
United Arab 
Emirates (31) 
Switzerland 
(21) 
Zambia (8) Spain (10) 
Singapore 
(13) 
Spain (3) 
Cayman 
Islands (6) 
France (3) Mexico (10) 
Italy (2) 
Netherlands 
(3) 
Netherlands 
(6) 
Belgium (1) Colombia (9) 
China:: 
Mainland (1) 
Kuwait (3) 
United Arab 
Emirates (6) 
Source: Calculations from IMF (2018) 
The following sub-sections provide case studies of the five global IFCs identified in the preceding 
analysis. Each study provides an overview of the centre’s financial flows and tax policies. Where 
available, a summary of analysis and evidence on the effects of the IFC’s policies on developing 
countries is also given.   
The Netherlands 
Financial flows 
The Netherlands is the top recipient of FDI globally and the second largest source (Table 5). In 
2016, it had a total of $4.1 trillion in inward direct investment positions (roughly five times its GDP) 
and had invested $5.1 trillion abroad (roughly 6.5 time its GDP). The Netherlands’ top investors 
are the US, Luxembourg, Bermuda, the UK and Switzerland. These countries are also the largest 
recipients of Dutch investment, with the exception of Bermuda which is surpassed by Germany. 
Table 5: The Netherlands’ FDI, 2016 
Source: Calculations from IMF (2018) and World Bank (2018) 
 Inward FDI  Outward FDI 
Gross positions (US$ Million) 4,083,833 5,093,952 
Share of national GDP (%) 525 655 
Share of world FDI (%) 13 17 
Global ranking of gross FDI 1 2 
Top five sources/ destinations United States (19%) 
Luxembourg (18%) 
Bermuda (10%) 
United Kingdom (9%) 
Switzerland (7%) 
Luxembourg (12%) 
United Kingdom (12%) 
United States (11%) 
Switzerland (8%) 
Germany (5%) 
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Tax policies 
Three features of Dutch tax policy make the Netherlands an attractive conduit for global FDI 
(Weyzig, 2013: 13; Hearson, 2014a: 31). First, the Netherlands has an extensive network of 
bilateral tax treaties which protect MNCs against double taxation. Second, withholding taxes levied 
on cross-border flows via the Netherlands are low. Under Dutch treaties, the rate of withholding 
tax that source countries may levy on foreign income tends to be particularly reduced. For example, 
the UK’s treaty with Ghana specifies a 7.5 percent withholding tax on UK MNCs’ dividend earnings 
there, while the Dutch treaty sets a 5 percent rate (Weyzig, 2013: 65). Additionally, the Netherlands 
does not levy withholding taxes on outgoing interest payments, royalties and certain types of profit 
(Weyzig, 2013: 64). Third, Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) registered in the Netherlands benefit 
from various special tax treatments (Weyzig, 2013: 58). These three features mean that a large 
number of MNCs have established Dutch SPEs in to order to invest in foreign countries, diverting 
a significant proportion of global FDI via the Netherlands (Weyzig, 2013: 13). 
Impact on developing countries 
Weyzig’s spillover analysis (2013: 57-9)  identifies multiple pathways by which Dutch tax policy 
may affect investment and tax revenue in developing countries, both positively and negatively 
(Figure 1). A tax treaty between the Netherlands and a developing country may generate additional 
FDI in the developing country (Figure 1, boxes 1 and 2), thus increasing the total volume of inward 
FDI (box A). In addition, if withholding tax reductions lower the cost of external borrowing, a tax 
treaty can increase investment by domestic MNCs in the developing country (box 3). For 
investments that already exist or would take place anyway (boxes 4 and 5), there is a tax rate 
effect (box B) if the tax treaty limits the host country’s withholding tax rates on interest or dividend 
payments. The treaty can then also affect the composition of investments (box C) because 
withholding taxes influence the relative costs of debt and equity. These rate and composition 
effects exist for domestic MNCs that raise funding in international capital markets as well (box 6).  
Finally, the Figure shows potential negative effects resulting from other aspects of the Dutch tax 
system. The absence of Dutch withholding tax on outgoing interest and royalty payments in 
combination with reduced taxes on incoming payments can result in the Netherlands being used 
as a “royalty conduit” (box 7). MNCs may send royalty and interest payments from a developing 
country to their resident country via the Netherlands rather than directly in order to reduce their 
withholding tax payments. This is known as treaty shopping, and it reduces the developing 
country’s tax base (box B). Additionally, the Netherlands’ special tax treatment of SPEs may result 
in MNCs shifting assets and profits to Dutch subsidiaries (box 8). In this instance, the Netherlands 
acts as a sink rather than a conduit, but the overall effect is to reduce the developing country’s 
corporate tax base further. 
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Figure 1: Potential spillovers of Dutch tax policy on developing countries 
 
Source: Weyzig, 2013: 58 
Weyzig (2013: 13-4) evaluates these potential pathways against the available evidence. Regarding 
volume effects, econometric studies on the effect of tax treaties on bilateral FDI have produced 
mixed results. Various studies find positive effects but these sometimes appear to be temporary 
or limited to middle income countries. However, the only study that specifically focuses on the 
effect of Dutch tax treaties on inward FDI in five developing countries (Philippines, Bangladesh, 
Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia) found no significant impact. Although it is possible that Dutch tax 
treaties with other developing countries have had a positive volume effect on FDI, evidence is 
currently unavailable. Regarding rate effects, a few academic analyses provide evidence of tax 
treaty shopping via the Netherlands by MNCs seeking to avoid withholding tax. They estimate that 
these effects lead to forgone withholding tax revenues in developing countries of between EUR 
150-550 million per year. Additionally Weyzig (2013: 69-70) provides some examples of MNCs 
that have engaged in profit-shifting via or to Dutch SPEs from developing countries. However, 
estimates of the resulting revenue loss for source country governments are unavailable. 
Weyzig (2013: 14) notes that a limitation of his analysis is that it does not consider the wider 
potential impacts of Dutch tax policy on development outcomes, including the redistribution of 
capital from developing countries to the Netherlands and the distortion of competition between 
MNCs and developing country firms. These negative effects on broader economic development 
may be “as important as the direct negative effect on public revenue mobilisation”. 
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The Cayman Islands 
Financial flows 
The Cayman Islands is a self-governed overseas territory of the UK (OECD, 2017: 23). It attracts 
2% of inward FDI and provides 2% of outward FDI globally (Table 6). Its top source of inward 
investment is the US, which provides 43% of the total, while its top destination is China, according 
to IMF data. However, a number of countries do not report their bilateral FDI with the Cayman 
Islands for confidentiality reasons, including Cyprus, Malta and Switzerland. Additionally, there is 
no data on the amount of inward investment from Mainland China and Singapore to the Cayman 
Islands.  
Table 6: The Cayman Islands’ FDI, 2016* 
Source: Calculations from IMF (2018).  
*The Cayman Islands do not participate in the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey. Data is derived from 
counterpart economies’ reported direct investment to/ from the Cayman Islands. 
** GDP data is unavailable for the Cayman Islands in the World Bank World Development Indicators 
Tax policies 
The Cayman Islands meet some of the OECD’s criteria for identifying tax havens (see Section 2) 
The jurisdiction has no direct tax on income, capital gains or sales (OECD: 2017: 24). Instead, 
government revenues are derived from the imposition of fees on the financial services industry, 
customs duties, work permit fees and tourist accommodation charges. The Cayman Islands were 
rated “largely compliant” with international standards for the exchange of tax information and 
transparency by the Global Forum’s 2017 peer review (OECD, 2017: 13). The rating was lowered 
from “compliant” due to patchy implementation of certain company laws, including requirements 
that all entities maintain beneficial ownership data and accounting information (OECD, 2017: 14-
15). However, the Cayman Islands score poorly against the TJN’s Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), 
ranking as the third most secretive jurisdiction worldwide after Switzerland and the US (TJN, 
2018a: 13). This is due to its low score against several indicators of corporate transparency, 
ownership registration and tax regulation integrity. 
The Cayman Islands’ low-tax and regulation-light environment supports a high concentration of 
financial services (TJN, 2018a: 1). The territory is the world’s eighth largest banking centre with 
total bank assets valued at $1.0 trillion (TJN, 2018a: 1). It is by far the largest offshore domicile for 
hedge funds, hosting 60% of global hedge fund assets, and the second largest for captive 
insurance companies (Fichtner, 2016: 1034; OECD, 2017: 25). Additionally, there is much 
suggestive evidence that MNCs take advantage of the Cayman Islands’ tax policies to engage in 
 Inward FDI  Outward FDI 
Gross positions (US$ Million) 620,806 579,628 
Share of national GDP (%) ** .. .. 
Share of world FDI (%) 2.1 2.0 
Global ranking of gross FDI 14 15 
Top five sources/ destinations* United States (43%) 
Netherlands (10%) 
Brazil (10%) 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong (9%) 
Canada (6%) 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong (19%) 
United States (15%) 
Luxembourg (14%) 
Singapore (10%) 
China, P.R. Mainland (8%) 
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profit-shifting strategies. For example, research by the US Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation 
found that in 2010, 6 percent of all US corporate foreign earnings and profits were recorded by 
subsidiaries located in the Cayman Islands (TJN, 2018a: 1). However, despite the Cayman Islands’ 
reputation as a leading IFC/ tax haven, Fichtner’s recent review of the evidence on the centre’s 
cross-border activities (2016: 1034) finds that its aggregate effect on global financial flows and tax 
revenues is “severely under-researched”.  
The UK 
Financial flows 
The UK is the sixth largest recipient of global FDI and the fourth largest source (Table 7). The 
value of its inward and outward FDI is just under $1.5 trillion, approximately half its GDP. The US 
is the top source and top destination of British FDI, followed by the Netherlands and Luxembourg.  
Table 7: The UK’s FDI, 2016 
 
Source: Calculations from IMF (2018) and World Bank (2018) 
Tax policies 
The Tax Justice Network and Action Aid (TJN, 2018b; Action Aid, 2016; Action Aid, 2013) identify 
at least four features of the UK tax system that give the jurisdiction “an ‘offshore’ tax haven 
character” and contribute to its status as a major IFC. First, the UK has one of the world’s largest 
tax treaty networks (Action Aid, 2016: 2). Second, the UK has jurisdiction or sovereignty over ten 
territories that are generally recognised as tax havens: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin 
Islands, the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat and the Turks 
& Caicos Islands (Action Aid, 2013: 7). Third, the UK offers an increasingly favourable corporate 
tax regime. For example, since 2010, it has lowered its headline corporate income tax rate from 
28 percent to 18 percent in 2019; relaxed controlled foreign company rules designed to deter 
MNCs from profit-shifting; and introduced new tax incentives such as the Patent Box, which allows 
companies to pay reduced income tax (10 percent) on profits derived from products that 
incorporate a patent (TJN, 2018b: 9). Fourth, the UK hosts various corporate structures and 
arrangements that may help facilitate tax avoidance, such as UK Limited Liability Partnerships 
(TJN, 2018b: 9). 
These features of the UK tax system, combined with the jurisdiction’s progressive deregulation of 
financial markets since the mid-1980s, have made London both a leading IFC and a major conduit 
of corporate offshore investment to/from “tax havens” (TJN, 2018b: 1; Fichtner et al., 2017). The 
TJN estimates that the UK accounts for 17 percent of the global market in offshore financial 
 Inward FDI  Outward FDI 
Gross positions (US$ Million) 1,388,273 1,439,067 
Share of national GDP (%) 52 54 
Share of world FDI (%) 5 5 
Global ranking of gross FDI 6 4 
Top five sources/ destinations* United States (33%) 
Netherlands (12%) 
Luxembourg (7%) 
Jersey (6%) 
France (6%) 
United States (25%) 
Netherlands (12%) 
Luxembourg (9%)) 
France (7%) 
Ireland (5%) 
14 
services, second only to the US (see below). London hosts the largest international insurance, 
foreign exchange and professional services markets in the world (OECD, 2013: 17). The UK’s 
banking sector conducts half of Europe’s investment banking activity and hosts the third largest 
deposits globally (OECD, 2013: 17). However, there is evidence that the UK is also a key conduit 
for MNCs engaging in profit-shifting. Fichtner et al. (2017) analyse firm-level ownership data for 98 
million firms and find that 14% of corporate offshore investment in tax havens is channelled via the 
UK. This is second only to the Netherlands, which routes 23% of total investment to tax havens. 
Impact on developing countries 
Action Aid (2012) conducted an analysis of the impact of the relaxation of the UK’s controlled 
foreign company rules on developing countries. Under the old rules, a British MNC that shifted 
profits into a tax haven in order to lower its tax bills would have to top up its payments at home, 
bringing it into line with the UK rate. Following government reforms in 2012, controlled foreign 
company rules would only apply to MNCs engaging in profit-shifting that was costly to the UK. 
They no longer applied to companies avoiding tax in developing countries (Action Aid, 2012: 2-4). 
Action Aid (2012: 4) estimated that the new rules would cost developing countries £4 billion 
annually in forgone tax revenue. 
The US 
Financial flows 
The US is the second largest recipient of global FDI and the largest source (Table 8). The UK, 
Japan, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are among its top counterparts for inward and outward 
investment. 
Table 8: The US’s FDI, 2016 
 
Source: Calculations from IMF (2018) and World Bank (2018) 
Tax policies 
The US ranks second in the TFN’s Financial Secrecy Index due to two key features of its tax 
system (TJN, 2018c: 1). First, the US has not joined the Global Forum’s Common Reporting 
Standards (CRS) programme, which is working to implement the internationally agreed AEOI 
standard (see section 2) (TJN, 2018c: 5). The CRS programme commits jurisdictions to obtaining 
certain taxpayer information from their financial institutions and automatically exchanging that 
information with other jurisdictions on an annual basis (OECD, n.d.). The US’s failure to join 
weakens information exchange for assets held in its jurisdictions (TJN, 2018: 6). Second, because 
 Inward FDI  Outward FDI 
Gross positions (US$ Million) 3,725,418 5,332,225 
Share of national GDP (%) 20 29 
Share of world FDI (%) 12 18 
Global ranking of gross FDI 2 1 
Top five sources/ destinations* United Kingdom (15%) 
Japan (11%) 
Luxembourg (11%) 
Canada (10%) 
Netherlands (10%) 
Netherlands (16%) 
United Kingdom (13%) 
Luxembourg (11%) 
Ireland (7%) 
Canada (7%) 
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company law is enacted at the state, rather than federal, level, several states host anonymous 
“shell” corporations and other secret, tax-free entities in order to attract investment (TJN, 2018: 6). 
Indeed, almost two million anonymous corporations and limited liability companies are formed in 
the US each year, many by foreigners (TJN, 2018: 7). Ownership anonymity facilitates tax 
avoidance, money laundering and other illicit activities. As a result of these features of the US tax 
system, TJN (2018: 1) concludes: 
The U.S. provides a wide array of secrecy and tax-free facilities for non-residents, both at 
a Federal level and at the level of individual states… While it has pioneered powerful ways 
to defend itself against foreign tax havens, it has not seriously addressed its own role in 
attracting illicit financial flows and supporting tax evasion. It is currently a jurisdiction of 
extreme concern for global transparency initiatives. 
Singapore 
Financial flows 
Singapore is the eight largest recipient of global FDI, with inward stocks valued at three times its 
GDP (Table 9). It shows more discrepancy in its top sources and destinations of investment than 
the previous case studies. While its sources of FDI are dominated by advanced economies and 
tax havens, its top destinations are mainly emerging economies in South and East Asia.  
Table 9: Singapore’s FDI, 2016 
 
Source: Calculations from IMF (2018) and World Bank (2018) 
* Singapore does not provide the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey with outward FDI data. Outward FDI 
data is derived from destination economies’ reported direct investment from Singapore. 
Tax policies 
Singapore ranks fifth on the TJN’s Financial Secrecy Index. The TJN justifies this ranking thus 
(TJN, 2018d: 5): 
Singapore has, in line with evolving international standards on transparency, made some 
significant moves to reform for the better. In addition, Singapore currently chairs the Peer 
Review Group in the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes. The most notable regulatory changes include: 
• Committing to the OECDs “on request” standard for information exchange; this was 
followed by the passing of a bill in November 2011 allowing Singapore to exchange 
information under its Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
 Inward FDI  Outward FDI* 
Gross positions (US$ Million) 975,790 526,413 
Share of national GDP (%) ** 329 177 
Share of world FDI (%) 3 2 
Global ranking of gross FDI 8 17 
Top five sources/ destinations* United States (18%) 
Japan (8%) 
Netherlands (7%) 
Virgin Islands, British (6%) 
Cayman Islands (6%) 
China, P.R.: Mainland (20%) 
Indonesia (12%) 
Luxembourg (11%) 
India (7%) 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong (7%) 
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• The passage in October 2009 of the Income Tax (Amendment) (Exchange of 
Information Bill to allow for the exchange of some bank and trust information 
• Including tax offences as predicate offenses for money laundering, from July 2013 
• Criminalising asset managers and bankers who wilfully conceal, possess or use 
proceeds of foreign tax offences “if they had reasonable grounds to believe that they 
were assisting the tax offender in retention or control of the proceeds of the foreign tax 
evasion”, effective 1 September 2014 
• Signing the multilateral agreement implementing the Common Reporting Standard on 
automatic exchange of information in June 2017 
However, Singapore continues to offer a range of secrecy offerings, including the popular 
Private Trust Company (PTC), which acts as a trustee for secretive trusts. A PTC, as one 
practitioner describes it, allows the wealthy individual a “higher level of control and discretion” 
than with standard trusts managed by a professional trustee. 
Singapore offers other tax exemptions too. There is full tax exemption for foreign-sourced 
income received in Singapore by any individual not resident in Singapore; there is an absence 
of capital gains, gift or estate taxes; and Singapore also boasts a quasi-territorial tax system 
that exempts from individual income tax all foreign-sourced income not remitted to Singapore. 
Various other tax incentives and loopholes exist for corporations too. In addition, Singapore 
has quite a wide array of tax treaties with other countries, and, partly as a result of this, it has 
become a major turntable for so-called ‘round-tripping’ into and out of India and other countries, 
competing against other centres like Mauritius. Round tripping occurs when an investor from, 
say, India, sends capital to Singapore, where it is hidden behind legal secrecy and 
subsequently returned to India via a Singaporean shell company, disguised illegally as foreign 
investment, in order to obtain tax and other benefits from the tax treaty that would not otherwise 
have been available to the Indian investor. [In summary,] Singapore also offers plenty of 
opportunities for tax arbitrage.  
In addition… Singapore has sought to provide a regulatory haven to help financial sector 
players escape financial regulations elsewhere. 
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